How Creatable is IGAD After The Summit Fiasco in Addis Ababa on August 25, 2014?

By Stephen Tut Puol,

Opinion.

Gen. Taban Deng Gai, the former Governor of Unity State, who leads SPLM-IO Negotiating team in Addis Ababa, glancing at Seyoum Mesfin, the chairperson of IGAD mediators(Photo: file)

Gen. Taban Deng Gai, the former Governor of Unity State, who leads SPLM-IO Negotiating team in Addis Ababa, glancing at Seyoum Mesfin, the chairperson of IGAD mediators(Photo: file)

Sept 15, 2014(Nyamilepedia) — For the benefit of our readers who might not be familiar; with the word “IGAD”; therefore, let us introduce to them a brief background of IGAD. “The word IGAD is an abbreviation of “Intergovernmental Authority on Development”. It is an eight-country trade bloc in Eastern Africa. It includes governments from the Horn of Africa, Nile Valley, and the African Great Lakes. Its headquarters is in Djibouti City. The founding member states of IGAD were: Djibouti (founding member 1986), Eritrea (admitted in 1993 and was suspended from the bloc in 2007), Ethiopia (founding member 1986), Somalia (founding member 1986). Nile Valley: Sudan (founding member 1986), South Sudan, was admitted in 2011) African Great Lakes: Kenya (founding member 1986), Uganda (founding member 1986).

The establishment of IGAD

The Inter-governmental Authority on Development was established in 1986. It succeeded the earlier Inter-governmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD), a multi-national body founded in 1986 by Djibouti, Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda and Kenya, with a focus on development and environmental control. IGADD’s headquarters were later moved to Djibouti, following an agreement signed in January 1986 by the member states. Eritrea joined the organization in 1993, upon achieving independence. In April 1995, the Assembly of Heads of State and Government met in Addis Ababa, where they agreed to strengthen cooperation through the organization. This was followed with the signing of a Letter of Instrument to Amend the IGADD Charter/Agreement on March 21, 1996. The revitalised IGAD, with a new organizational structure, was eventually launched on November 25, 1996 in Djibouti in September 2006, the African Union Peace and Security Council approved an IGAD proposal to deploy an IGAD Peace Support Mission in Somalia (IGASOM). On February 21, 2007 the United Nations Security Council approved Resolution 1744, which authorized the deployment of a new African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) in place of IGASOM.

Current situation of IGAD

IGAD is a principal supporter of the Federal Government of Somalia through the AMISOM initiative. IGAD expanded its activities in 2008 with initiatives to improve the investment, trade and banking environments of member states. The organization stressed the deployment of highly innovative programmes and mechanisms.

Structure

The Assembly of Heads of State and Government is the supreme policy making organ of the Authority. It determines the objectives, guidelines and programs for IGAD and meets once a year. A Chairman is elected from among the member states in rotation. The Secretariat is headed by an Executive Secretary appointed by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government for a term of four years renewable once. The Secretariat assists member states in formulating regional projects in the priority areas, facilitates the coordination and harmonization of development policies, mobilizes resources to implement regional projects and programs approved by the Council and reinforces national infrastructures necessary for implementing regional projects and policies. The current Executive Secretary is Engineer Mahboub Maalim of Kenya (since 14 June 2008). The Council of ministers is composed of the ministers of Foreign Affairs and one other minister designated by each member state. The Council formulates policy, approves the work program and annual budget of the Secretariat during its bi-annual sessions. The Committee of Ambassadors comprises of IGAD member states’ Ambassadors or Plenipotentiaries accredited to the country of IGAD Headquarters. It convenes as often as the need arises to advise and guide the Executive Secretary. This is a brief background of Inter-governmental Authority on Development known as IGAD in short. Many people might not be aware of IGAD success or achievement as an institution, but one thing which IGAD can account on was the Signing of Navisha Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005, between the Government of Sudan and Sudan People’s Liberation Movement and Sudan People’s Liberation Army, (SPLM/SPLA), which was signed in Kenya.

IGAD’s credibility is seriously damaged by the recent South Sudan summit fiasco, when a shambolic heads of state summit adopted an ‘inclusive’ Protocol that doesn’t include most of the parties to the talks; changed, at the last minute, the text of the Protocol, virtually ensuring the SPLM/A -In Opposition) wouldn’t sign; and endorsed a cessation of hostilities implementation matrix that the SPLM/A (IO) claims it never saw, amidst such confusion that even attendees at the summit weren’t sure of what happened.  Something seriously must have gone terribly wrong within IGAD administration in Addis Ababa Summit. Even in a normal social contract of marriage; when two couples are getting marriage, it is always the subjects that signed the marriage certitificate first before the witnesses, and then the Pastor or the Priest who conducted marriage can then sign after the couples and the witnesses have signed the marriage certificate. But surprisingly it was opposite in that fiasco summit; the head of states signed the Protocol first before the warring parties could sign their document. In which the head of states have hijacked the Peace Protocol to be their own and not the warring parties.

Uganda, the bogeyman                                                                   

Since the IGAD mediation began, there has been criticism of the region’s lack of impartiality and double standard in the peace talks. How can an invaded force’s like Uganda, be at the same times a peace broker in South Sudan peace talks? This criticism, however, overlooked one crucial point: the differences between IGAD member states and the IGAD mediation run by the largely autonomous chief mediator, Seyoum Mesfin of Ethiopia. Certainly, Ugandan interests and military intervention caused and continue to cause any number of complications. Again, the Heads of state can do whatever they like, ignore the guidance of their appointed mediators and change the draft documents that appear in front of them.  While no one, save the South Sudan government, is standing up for the document today, there was broad agreement amongst all parties on 25 of the 28 articles in the Protocol on Agreed Principles on Transitional Arrangements Towards Resolution of the Crisis in South Sudan.  While the original draft was not perfect, in its original form the SPLM/A (IO), the former detainees and the political parties, civil societies, the faith base, as well as the government, would likely have signed the document. Two of the three disputed articles (Articles 2 and 3) were changed at the summit, after the draft text had been introduced. The most significant change is in Article 2. The original text provided for South Sudan’s president to serve as head of state and for the prime minister to serve as head of government, with the powers of each to be negotiated in the talks.  The final text combined these roles: the president would be head of state and government.

This change came as a direct result of the intervention of Uganda’s President, Yoweri Museveni, who argued that a transitional government could not change the constitutional order: if the president was head of state and government now, he should remain so in the transition period.  From there, changing article 3 was a formality. The carefully crafted draft didn’t matter: the head of states have spoken by making up their minds to joint in an ethnic fight alongside their colleague president Salva Kiir Mayardit. The whole plan from the head of states is to Crash the Nuer Community from the map of South Sudan and from the map of Africa.

Summit screw-ups: incompetence, not design

The IGAD heads of state summit had two original objectives. The first was to definitively end the circular argument over the Cessation of Hostilities (CoH) Agreement, dating to January 2014.  The government argued that it could not continue political negotiations until the CoH was truly in force; the SPLM/A (IO) argued it would not sign the CoH implementation modalities until Ugandan forces withdrew. The result of these duelling, intractable positions was no progress on any front. After many months, language that was acceptable to both parties – see section 1.2 (e) of the matrix – was developed, and on that basis brought to the summit for final signature.

IGAD’s incompetence gave the SPLM/A (IO) an escape from this commitment.  The operative paragraphs on the perambulatory pages of the CoH re-dedication clearly commit the signatories of the document to the terms of the CoH implementation matrix.  But in the confusion precipitated by shoddy organization and the looming departure of the heads of state, no one from IGAD obtained the copy of the matrix signed by government and SPLM/A (IO), and nobody asked either party to sign or initial each page of the matrix, as the convention of Protocol dictates. Later, the SPLM/A (IO) was able to justify that it had only signed the CoH re-dedication, not the matrix, and recommenced the same cycle of arguments about the withdrawal of the Ugandan forces.  Requested to initial the pages of the matrix in the days following the summit, and the SPLM/A (IO) chief negotiator point blank refused.  IGAD’s position is that the matrix was signed by virtue of the operative clauses of the preamble.

The second aim of the summit was to introduce a Protocol, to be endorsed by all the May 9 Agreement ‘stakeholders’ government, opposition, the former detainees, political parties, civil society and faith based leaders, which would advance the ongoing multi-stakeholder negotiations by locking in agreement on the key principles, and shaping the area for future negotiation-to end talks about talks.  The draft of the agreement originally read: “The Government of the Republic of South Sudan and SPLM/A (IO) shall be signatories of this Protocol. The other stakeholders shall endorse this Protocol; the member states of IGAD, and the undersigned Partners of IGAD and Friends of South Sudan, shall serve as guarantors and witnesses of this Protocol.”

But witnesses the signature page of the signed Protocol: it is silent about signatories and guarantors.  By oversight, not design, the hastily edited document removed the signature lines for the other stakeholders. The event was such a mess that the protocol officer’s didn’t even remember to invite representatives of the former detainees, political parties, civil societies and faith base leaders into the summit room.  Instead, they remained in the National Palace’s ballroom all day, while the summit stumbled on down the hall.  Government mouthpiece Michael Makuei gloated: ‘I didn’t see you in the hall,’ he told the former detainees and political party leaders afterwards. Naturally, the other stakeholders felt they had been purposely left out, or ignored when poor management, not purposeful exclusion, was the cause.  IGAD endorsed an inclusive agreement that forgot inclusivity, and signed an agreement in the name of stakeholders who weren’t even present.

The credibility of IGAD mediators and its Head of states,

IGAD credibility is seriously damaged by the summit fiasco signed on August 25, 2014 in Addis Ababa, but at the same time important and unprecedented, ideas are now part of the framework of the peace process. In rebuilding the process, the focus must shift to these principles: while the future today is on the mechanics of an elite, power sharing arrangement, real change was only ever going to come from the pursuit of other ideas-not in haggling over the predatory arrangements of the executive, which no matter its configuration is almost destined to disappoint whomever observes this drama too closely. Future talks will only be useful if the negotiations focus on actions and reforms in the future transitional arrangements, and not only about who wields power.[i]

On August 23, 2014 Nurye Yassin, a researcher on African and Middle Eastern affairs, wrote an article under the title: The blame game on IGAD Peace Process clashes with reality: The article was published on Saturday, August 23, 2014 by “The Reporter: Vol. XVIII.937/3 an Addis Ababa, base Newspaper. The article blame game was explaining to the readers, the slow progress of an IGAD-led mediation process to the failures of IGAD Special Envoys lacks a grain of truth and urges anyone to question their ability and creditability in the search for the right answers to this desperate situation. The pressing and deteriorated situation even tempts both optimists and doubters to question the collective capacities, capability and creditability of IGAD experts, for – example Dr. Reik Machar’s, leader of the SPLM/A-In-Opposition, and Michael Makuei’s, South Sudan’s minister of Information, recent remarks are a case in point the writer argued. For instance, Dr Reik Machar told on August 14 China’s Talk Africa that he did not see any peace to be achieved “because of the weakness of IGAD mediators.” In a similar vein, Michael Makuei told Press TV that the mediation process had not been in the vanguard of the cause of peace to helping the parties bridge their disagreements and reach an agreement on the Matrix. He added that “the problem is not the parties, but the problem is with the mediation itself.”

This kind of collective portrayal of the “weakness” of IGAD-led mediation and the failures of IGAD Special Envoys, Head of states, begs for a careful scrutiny to decipher the parties’ calculus and praxis in the coming period. Shockingly, these warring factions seem to veil their laxity in making the people of South Sudan victims in their own power play as well as get away from the inescapable imperative to stopping the carnage and terminating the further fragmentation of the nation. The IGAD Special Envoys have shouldered the responsibility of facilitating the peace process and helping the parties reach an agreement coupled with promising outcomes and developments for the better future of South Sudan and ending the crisis in line with the instructions, role and mandate given by the IGAD Heads of State and Government. This has unleashed a new era of establishing a Transitional Government of National Unity and finalizing the Cessation of Hostilities Matrix. But to the dismay of the people of South Sudan, they have failed to come up with an acceptable Protocol to both parties, and to meet the deadline in expediting the dialogue on the formation of a Transitional Government of National Unity within sixty days (June 10 -August 10).[1]

The clash of personal and political interests is taking hold to hijack the hard-won freedom. It also reflects how far the then so called SPLM/SPLA liberators have departed from the arduous road of building a vibrant nation built on pluralism, inclusion, good governance, democracy and rule of law. It also shows how the aspirations, hopes and demands of the people of South Sudan, emerged from self-determination, are distilled by the personalization of governance built on corruption, inequality, insecurity, militarization, disillusionment and bad governance as well as the winner-takes–all mindset at the altar of the theater of war. This situation compels any keen observer to underpin how the warring factions seem to forget or neglect the uncompleted journey of independence from exclusion, marginalization and inequality. Or it may tempt to point out how the liberators become foundational bedrock in the making of the peripheralization of the people of South Sudan inheriting the legacy of Sudan. Put simply, the liberators become the new oppressors, betraying the hopes and needs of their peoples. This perpetuation of violence hastens the downward spiral of the survival of South Sudan to dwarfing issues of progress, inclusion, pluralism, good governance, security and a developmental mindset.

Likewise, IGAD needs to be aware not to compel South Sudanese to a wrong solution because any alien imposition of solutions to South Sudan problem will only postpone the crisis to another time. Digging deep into the flaws of the party and the prices being exacted by the people of South Sudan will undoubtedly yield the possible remedies to heal the wound and end the fragility of the nation. South Sudanese people deserve the right to development and to live freely. But this requires ceasing hostilities, expediting dialogue, listening to the hearts of the people of South Sudan, looking beyond personal and political ambitions, envisaging to bequeath a plural, peaceful and prosperous South Sudan to the coming youth, and calculating the danger of the violence in threatening the collective peace, security and development of the region.

IGAD should consider the significance of forming a panel of the wise men from the IGAD region tasked with supplementing the activities and efforts of the IGAD Special Envoys and elevating the landmark achievements gained so far to new heights. IGAD should go beyond condemning the violent acts of the conflicting parties, calling them to abide by agreements and reiterating punitive measures to salvage South Sudan from taking “the road to zero-self-destruction” and embarking on a bleak future.

Biel Boutros Biel, in his analysis on August 25, Peace Protocol, believed that IGAD is caught in a dilemma between telling the truth that may displease its Head of States and pleasing Yoweri Museveni and President Salva Kiir. Boutros, argued that IGAD members who drafted the Protocol document, drafted it with emotion specially in making a reference of who shall lead the so called ‘Transitional Government of National Unity’ and ‘Commander-in-Chief of Armed Forces’ they wrote in reference to President Salva Kiir as; ‘shall be the elected, incumbent President of the Republic.’ By adding the word ‘elected’ with emphasis, makes foolery of the intelligence of South Sudanese people. However, Boutros alerted the drafters of the document that the presidency of Salva Kiir, came into question since December 15, 2013. Therefore, this Protocol has exposed the hidden agenda of IGAD Head of states that they are no any longer neutral and they have never been neutral in this crisis, in which they have no capability or credibility to bring to an end the South Sudan conflict since they have taken side in an ethnic conflict.

Another shame was again in paragraph 2 of the preamble; which purports that the stakeholders are concerned to stop the ‘senseless loss of life, mass displacement and destruction of property.’ This is quite an emotional provision and if we may ask; is there sensible loss of life, sensible destruction of property and sensible mass displacement? This unconsciousness in this document shows the realities behind the scene of IGAD.

Principle 4 of the Protocol provides for the office of the prime minister (PM) to be nominated by the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement or Army-In Opposition (SPLM-IO) under Dr. Riek Machar and must be acceptable to the president, according to Principle 5, he or she shall work in harmony with the president. This is not in dispute but it needs no political philosopher to guess the intention of IGAD as to why in principle 6; they stated; that the prime minister will not be eligible to contest or stand for any public office in national elections at the end of the Transitional Period, which is ‘unfair provision, because it is democratic right of every citizen to contest any position in any election as long as she or he qualify or full-filled the requirements of the electoral commission and the National Constitution.

Why IGAD has to barred out the proposed prime minister from contesting the election when the president is qualify to subject him-self, to election this is unfair provision?

Firstly, it proves that the Protocol was stage-managed by a group of people within IGAD or without, with a mind-set of barring out the leader of the SPLM/SPLA – In Opposition, from being a part of the Transitional Government or in any future Government in South Sudan. In principle 4 above, to prove the ‘already decided matter at the back of the minds of IGAD member’ Head of states in making reference to the competence for the person to become the prime minister, a reference of ‘him’ has been made. Who is ‘him’ in this matter? Does it mean the SPLM-IO has no competent lady to take up the position?

IGAD mediators should have appreciated that, one of the principles of natural justice is that; no one should be a judge in his or her own cause. This simply means that, a person cannot sit to decide on a case where his or her interests are the subject matter and will be expected not clash with his or her official position. Commonsense would dictate that such a person is likely to favour his or her own side of the story.

This is exactly what IGAD has done. Presidents Salva Kiir and Yoweri Museveni of Uganda have their troops on the ground fighting the SPLM/A-IO, forces and with the sole aim of preventing the Opposition from overthrowing President Kiir. If IGAD allows the two Presidents to be in such summit which they rightly belong by their virtues of their positions as Head of states, then it could have followed logically that IGAD should not have allowed itself to deliberate on South Sudan’s issue when the two presidents participated and are in complete conflict of interests of preserving the position of president Kiir, versus the interests of South Sudanese people. In such situation, President Salva Kiir and President Yoweri Museveni, sit on their own case and have become judges on their own cause against the principles of natural justice. To put it blatantly, it was an opportunity for president Kiir to see a document that gangs-off, his rival Dr. Riek Machar and in fact he did it as he managed to have a provision, that slammed on the face of Dr. Riek Machar which barring him from contesting in ‘any public office in the future elections.

What are the implications of barring the ‘assumed prime minister’ from taking part in future elections?

The provision of principle 6 of the Protocol, if implemented, is very dangerous, in the sense that, it is a discrimination against individual and its spirit cannot survive Constitutional matter. It is unconstitutional and it is against the very heart of South Sudanese supreme law; which is the Constitution.

Article 14 of the Transitional Constitution of South Sudan 2011, provides for equality before the law and it goes further to prohibit discrimination on the ground of race, ethnic origin, colour, sex, language, religious creed, political opinion, birth, locality or social status. In view of the above Constitutional provision, that barred out the proposed person to be prime minister from contesting in any national elections, has been discriminated on ground of political opinion and would add; social status as well. Furthermore, if IGAD, Museveni and Kiir, have in mind Dr. Riek Machar, which truly they had, then he could be assumed to have been discriminated on the above mentioned two grounds and would also include his ethnic origin because there is no reason provided and in the thoughts of Kiir and Museveni, the Nuer factor’ in Dr. Riek Machar’s situation, presumably might have played the melody in their thinking.

Under Regional and International Human Rights instruments, though South Sudan is not a party to some or most of these principles, but they should be persuasively used in this argument to show the depth of the dangers of what IGAD had doctored in the Protocol barring an individual from his or her natural right to participate. It is surprising as to why would IGAD choose to violate a known equality principle enshrined in their respective Constitutions, leave alone the International Human Rights Law.

Article 13 (1) of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (hereafter referred to as ‘The African Charter’) provides for one to participate in the affairs of his or her government directly or through a representative of his or her choice. In this case, it is strange that IGAD members, all of whom accepted South Sudan, as member states to the African Charter, could insert such an unpopular provision against the heart of the African Charter.

Articles 16 and 26 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), respectively provides for equality before the law and outlaw any discrimination on any ground. Specifically, article 25 of the ICCPR, like African Charter, provides for one right to participate in one’s own government. Articles 1, 2, 6, 7 and 21 of the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights (though a non-binding law) provide for freedom and equality, non-discrimination, recognition before the law as well as right to participate freely in one’s own government and public affairs of his or her own country.[2] With all the above National, Regional and International Human Rights instruments prohibiting discrimination on any ground, it is strange that the members of IGAD allowed themselves to be misled to the extent of disrespecting clear norms of equality and instead of solving the problem they added more fuel to South Sudan conflict by making such a bad rule and by drafting such a unpopular Protocol in Addis Ababa, in trying to black mail Dr. Riek Machar and the Nuer Community.

     Other observable points in IGAD proclaimed documents

Another implication is in the implementation of Matrix and Addendum especially the un-reluctant provision of the withdrawal of the foreign troops from South Sudan, but since by concern is to point out the dangers of having an emotionally charged Protocol and imposition of a provision contrary to South Sudan Constitution, Regional and International Human Rights instrument, we have to leave it to the conventional wisdom of South Sudanese at negotiating table. But one thing to add, is the mere expansion of the current most incompetent Legislature in the region, as IGAD presupposes, serves as final insult to the South Sudanese people. The proclaimed Transitional Government of National Unity, it’s, won’t work, the two years won’t be completed without a war and the causes shall emanate from the failure of resolving the causes of the current war. Besides, it appears to that the incoming government if in fact it will come, shall be a government that consumes than develops, that divides than unites, the causes are on every wall and IGAD knows very well. Many political and military analysts predict an ongoing devastated war plus a sever famine in this coming dry season in South Sudan due to the failure of IGAD mediators and their double standard in South Sudan conflict.

In other term IGAD is caught in a position of conflicting loyalties; to please Troika countries, the donors and United Nations that threatens with sanctions any time soon. Another observation; is that it seems there are many camps whose interests are not centred on finding peaceful solution to our conflict, but to score political history hence, would continue to confuse IGAD for eternity. Another group has its interests on donors funding hence continue to design boisterous projects in claim for peace but in actual sense, are sponsored to cause a row in the negotiations so that the donors interests continue to flourish and experts continue to exist. Some more groups also seem to be concerned on how their salaries and safety can be secured in Juba. That group, will sing non-stop; ‘justice, accountability’ when in fact, they don’t believe in it, but rather singing so to avoid saying anything truthful to IGAD while others tend to project future leanings with the Opposition and still are at lukewarm with Juba regime.

While IGAD is caught in between protecting the ‘boys in the club,’ and please the sponsored ‘international agents’ it is even more complicated when it seems the body itself is not in terms or in a position of drafting its own documents, when the language clearly appears to be somebody’s else material; we can detect our wordings, don’t we? That said, IGAD is in terrible dilemma if they cannot come to their senses, they would continue to listen to dangerous ideas and advices which would destroy South Sudan. If the focus is on individuals and not on underlying causes of the conflict, we are afraid IGAD’s approach would generate more wars rather than bring peace. Peace-building, dialogue and reconciliation among the South Sudanese community are the only way forward if South Sudan can remains as one country after the December Genocide.

“Finally, a nation that lives on the myths of denials of the bitter past and uncomforted present truth, sits on a time bomb which bedevils its future. So it is a shame for all men and women of conscience to stand aloof in the name of neutrality when the whole humanity is descending into grave and near to extinction. We are therefore, convinced that, for the least of our brethren, we must choose the path least travelled and stand with those who cannot speak for themselves. Let’s focus on the causes of the ongoing civil war and resolve it amicably to help our generation and the posterity to live a life non-humiliated and with that; the rest shall fall in line. We cannot put equity on the cross for the sake of our own interests which won’t help South Sudan today and beyond. IGAD must face the reality of their responsibilities in the region if it has to continue as a regional body that can be entrusted with regional problems.

Prof. David De-Chand; a frustrated academician turned politician, also wrote a critique on IGAD Protocol on Agreed principles on Transitional, he argued that realistically the IGAD has failed its duties, responsibilities and obligations entrusted to it by the United Nation Security Council (UNSC) and the office of the UN Secretary-General, H.E. Booki Moon to address professional, effectively and efficiently the root causes of the ongoing acutely and the aggravating in South Sudan.

This critical and escalating civil war that has already involved genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, atrocities and other heinous crimes committed against humanity has not fully, honestly and legitimately tackled reasonably and more effectively in the course of the past nine (9) months of war, bloodshed and massive human suffering in South Sudan. It is now about time that African leaders must and ought to deal and to find durable, just and permanent solutions to African problems rather than looking externally to solutions on African problems. It is now about time to cut off “dependency syndrome” and the bureaucratic red tape to become more creative, assertive and critical in seeking solutions to pending African politico-military and socio-economic problems by African leaders. There were demands presented a few months ago before the IGAD mediators as the roadmap to peace and conflict resolution and all of them remained unimplemented or unexecuted, unfortunately. These demands were as follows that:-

(1) There was a demand that President Salva Kiir, must and ought to step down from power and hand over all the state powers to the governed as the final authority that all powers emanated from in any given nation-states. If and when Salva Kiir could do the aforesaid demand, the roadmap for peace would be clearer and smoother than ever before. Nevertheless, as long as Salva Kiir’s resists this demand, the roadmap to peace remains murky, grim and with no light in the end of the tunnel.

(2) Immediate and unconditional withdrawal of all foreign forces from South Sudan-mainly- Ugandan People’s Defense Forces (UPDF), mercenaries and Soldiers of Fortune, Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) (Tarabora), South Revolutionary Front (SRF) and the SPLM/A-North (SPLM/A-N) and any other hired foreign forces and other witchcraft men which was reported to have been hired by the authority in Juba. President Salva Kiir Mayardit has committed genocide, massacres, mass killings, which has now resulted to the current civil war which the country is facing. The loss of lives, mass internal displacement and destruction of the socio-economic infrastructure, due to the gravity of the situation in the country, the ongoing war cannot be permitted to continue amid the threats of war-induced-famine and further devastation, to end the war and to restore peace, security and political stability in South Sudan.

(3) Full explanation on the targeted Nuer ethnic group for genocide… as the gravest and the greatest crimes against humanity as declared by the UN Convention on Genocide adopted as the United Nations resolution 260 (III) A on 9 December 1948 and came into effect on 12 January 1951, and

(4) Formation of a Transitional Administration, which must be without the participation of President Salva Kiir Mayardit.

(5) Unless the aforementioned have been diligently, effectively and efficiently discussed and concluded, the roadmap to peaceful and political conflict resolution in South Sudan looks grim, doomed and gloomed. There would be of course, no peace in South Sudan if any of the preceded conditions have not been fully met as pre-requisites to peace in South Sudan.

There was also demand from the SPLM/SPLA – In Opposition that President Salva Kiir, must provide material evident of the alleged coup d’état attempt, which Uganda dictator Yoweri Museveni, stated loud and clear for the first time that “No coup attempt has occurred in Juba, saying what caused the crisis in mid-December 2013 was simply a fighting between the Presidential Guards”. President Museveni further added that “Fighting erupted when Salva Kiir, ordered the Presidential Guards Commander to disarmed Machar’s Nuer ethnicity member of Presidential Guards, in Juba” that triggered the genocide against thousands of the Nuer nationality, as a “final solution” in whole or in part. The South Sudanese public would like to know in details from Salva Kiir the root causes of the probable cause of genocide against the targeted Nuer nationality. Based on Dr. De-chand analysis, the IGAD mediators have failed their social responsibility in resolving the crisis in South Sudan. The Protocol signed encourages the escalation of the war rather than de-escalating it. Furthermore, the IGAD mediators have failed to discuss in full the issue of genocide that targeted massacred against the Nuer people for extermination as a “final solution” on 15-19 December 2013 that shall be known hereinafter as the December 15, 2013 Juba Genocide.

Cognizant, that the IGAD has failed to adequately provide appropriate explanation, it has failed its duties, obligations and responsibilities as a regional organization significantly empowered under the UN Charter Article 52 to deal with regional matters for the preservation of international peace and security and the prevention of genocide. As consequence, the IGAD mediators give the Nuer nationality the green light to undertake committing the same genocide that targeted against more than 50,000 Nuer ethnic groups in Juba alone. Further mass killings and massacres have been committed in Jonglei, Unity, Upper Nile and Bahr-el-Ghazel States. The Uganda Air Force (UAF) has used salvos or sorties internationally banned bombs such as cluster bombs, Napalm bombs and the White Phosphorous bombs with side effects to human life and environment and the ecosystem in South Sudan.

One of the factor our readers would like to know is why did IGAD, mediators have completely and totally avoided or ignored to discussions or consider in the Protocol document the issue of the Genocide committed in Juba, on December 15, 2013 when it is a gravest and the greatest crimes against humanity. The UN Security Council and the Office of the UN Secretary-General, that appointed the IGAD to mediate or to deal with this acutely and aggravating situation in South Sudan, should not be exonerated, but should be considered as part and parcel of the problem rather than part of the solution.

Firstly, the Protocol although given forty-five (45) days for the formation of a Transitional Government of National Unity (TGONU) has been rushed, smuggled to be drafted outside of the IGAD premises, it offers no best progress and no chance for peace, tranquility, national unity and national integration and reconciliation as the way forward. Unless the IGAD mediators spin or turn the clock backward to adequately and sufficiently address the root causes of genocide against the targeted Nuer ethnic group, the roadmap to peace and the TGONU would be imperatively impractical, if not impossible, to attain in South Sudan.

Secondly, failure on Salva Kiir to step down from the helm of power and to turn all the state powers apparatus to the governed, it would be unlikelihood that the South Sudan could move forward, but we could move as if in a vicious cycle and in a snail speed to achieve peaceful and political conflict resolution in South Sudan crisis.

Thirdly, the failure of withdrawal of foreign forces from South Sudan, soil without any pre-conditions is an obstacle to peace, reconciliation, cooperation and the way forward.

Fourthly, even if peace returns, South Sudan would not be the same again. It would always remain unstable, disintegrated and disunited. It has already become a failed state and unsecured state that is moving from being ungovernable, lawlessness, and rampant corruption and the insecure state is now moving from being stateless to statelessness. Therefore, if IGAD failed to help the South Sudan sooner than later, as its seem to be the case, South Sudan, would end up disintegrating, into three Greater States: – The Greater Upper Nile region autonomous, the same with Greater Bahr El Gazal region and Greater Equatoria region, so each region would seek a political divorce from the Central Government in Juba.[3]

Inclusion:

IGAD has loss its credibility as a result of the summit fiasco, which took place in Addis Ababa on August 25, 2014. Protocol in question has disappointed many IGAD admires because the document has exposed how quick IGAD has discredited its institution from being presumed as a neutral mediator between the warring parties in the South Sudanese conflict; to become an outright partaker in an ethnic conflict by siding with president Salva Kiir, as the incumbent leader in that imposed Protocol without giving both sides the benefit of the doubt in the document in question. This is a willful premeditated plan to impose a tyrant and an illegitimate leader on the suffering people of this country. A president who have targeted a section of his people solely on ethnic grounds and exterminated over 50,000 thousand innocent unarmed Nuer civilians based on their ethnicity, should not be enabled and rewarded to remain in power as that is considered an affront to those whom he has exterminated in cold blood.

Moreover, it’s a negligent disregard to the proven 9 months old conflict mediation/resolution mechanisms throughout mankind’s vast history of quest for just solutions to conflicts. If IGAD is at all concerned about its image as an honest and neutral mediator who would still command the respect of the downtrodden people of South Sudan and all the peace loving people of the region it must shelve this bias document and continue to further redeem itself by adhering to the principle of impartiality in its mediation efforts. As stakeholders in this conflict, we care about our people and wish to negotiate a just and lasting peace to this war so that our country can experience peace and normalcy and our people can begin to enjoy dividends of peace, and be able to dialogue with one another in order to forge a national reconciliation and peace-building among the South Sudanese communities. However, IGAD needs to be serious in its quest for peace in South Sudan; otherwise, it might force the stakeholders to call for a different forum that would spearhead this important task of peace making between the two warring parties and in the region as large. (The author of this article can be reach through the following email address:

stephentut@swissmail.org)

[1] Nurye Yassin, The Blame game on IGAD Peace Clashes with reality.

[2] Biel Boutros Biel, IGAD’s Protocol and the intertwining interests on South Sudan’s, Crisis.

[3] Prof. De-chand, A Critique of IGAD Protocol on Agreed Principles on Transitional Arrangements towards Resolution of the Crisis in South Sudan.

[i] African Arguments editors, Addis dispatches (part two): Making Sense of the Sudan, Bookmark the permalink.

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