By Tor Madira Machier,
April 1, 2015(Nyamilepedia) — The leadership of the movement the SPLM/A must develop a new shift in the military strategic planning that would seek to strengthen the position of SPLA and subsequently will boost the morale of the troops. These would require a solid establishment of a strong intelligence body that would provides the operation with a real genuine operational military data.
Across the Upper Nile’s federal states, and Lich State for example, the movement had only concentrated to identify the state capital Bentiu as the primary military operational target for the movement. However, this is a wrong assumption of this particular military doctrine for this particular operational field from the military intelligence sector of the movement that highlight to the diehard supporters and political sympathizers of the movement the weakness of the SPLA’s fourth military infantry division.
Liberation of Bentiu without first the liberation of government’s strategic strongholds like Parieng county headquarters means nothing than simply winning a battle that would be exceptionally lost to the enemy the following day and subsequently loses the main expectation of the battle, which ironically means losing the war.
Parieng county is a government stronghold in Lich state in addition to the Abiemnom county in which the government uses them for reinforcement. The strategic Ida airstrip in Parieng county as well as the Abiemnom’s strategic bridge that links Warrap state to the Greater Lich region offer the dictatorial regime of Salva Kiir with cheaper cost mean reinforcement to its genocidal troops against the movement’s SPLA.
The recapture of Bentiu in May by the pro-government troops was simply due to government’s huge and cheap reinforcement routes by airlifting troops using Ida airstrip as well as reinforcing troops from division three from Bahr Al-Gazhal using Abiemnom bridge.
For Bentiu to be liberated for good and for all, Parieng must be first subdued to the control of the freedom fighters, closing all the strategically important installation being used by the regime in Juba to down-roots its presence in the oil-rich Lich state, including the narrow roads used by the Sudan Revolutionary Front rebels and in-Justice and Inequality Movement (JEM) to cross to the Republic of South Sudan from southern Kordofan state with the aim of reinforcing the Juba loyalists tribal army.
The Author, Tor Madira Machier is a South Sudaness student pursuing Law Degree at the University of Ain Shams in Cairo Egypt and a member of the SPLM/A in opposition and can be reached through: firstname.lastname@example.org.